By Alex D Luta

Abstract

The 2008 and 2012 presidential campaigns provided interesting case studies of the role of local field offices and the “ground game” in presidential elections. Traditionally, the vast majority of campaigns’ financial resources have been spent on media advertising, but these presidential elections involved significant spending on the establishment of local field offices and organizing campaign staff at the local level (the “ground game”). After collecting and analyzing data from these elections, political scientists and journalists agree that the “ground game” has a significant impact on voter turnout and vote share for the party employing the strategy. Clearly, this strategy is becoming increasingly important for winning presidential elections. In this paper I discuss traditional campaigning methods, including media advertising, provide in-depth analysis of the “ground game” and the technology involved, and cover inherent implications for the future of political campaigns. Lastly, I put the material covered in context by relating it to well-known political science theories regarding voting behaviors. The content and arguments presented in my paper support the “ground game” as having great potential to be the focal point of future presidential campaigns.

Biography

Alex D Luta is currently a junior at Georgetown University pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in government with a minor in theology and a pre-med concentration. He won the American Association for the Advancement of Science’s inaugural Science and Human Rights Student Poster Competition for his research on applications of geospatial technology to human rights monitoring. Alex’s research interests include political science and exploring the intersection of science and human rights.

The 2008 and 2012 elections provided interesting case studies of the role of local field offices and the “ground game” in presidential elections. These elections involved more money spent than ever before. With such financial resources, candidates had the ability to make the most out of their campaigns. While most of the financial resources were spent on television and radio advertising, a significant amount was spent on establishing local field offices and organizing campaign staff at the local level. This represented an unexpected shift in campaign tactics, as television and radio advertising usually far outweigh any local campaigning activity. Political scientists and journalists have been able to collect data on the influence of these local field offices from the elections, and both agree that they are crucial to election results by influencing both voter turnout and vote share for the party employing the local strategy. This topic has been relatively under-studied, but has enormous implications for campaigning.
My argument is that the “ground war,” or mobilizing voters at the local level, is becoming increasingly important for winning presidential elections. Utilizing contemporary technology, the Obama campaign had access to troves of data on potential supporters, allowing it to engage in micro-targeting that could be executed at the grassroots level. The campaign took a risk into new territory and decided to put more money into a local grassroots ground game. Political scientists and journalists were able to assess the impact of this strategy, and early evidence from the Obama campaigns indicates that local face-to-face campaigning facilitated by field offices has a significant impact on the voting behavior of the electorate. Previously, campaigns did not have access to such vast data on the electorate or computational methods to analyze the data to determine where to place field offices and what messages to deliver. The research suggests that opening field offices is a highly effective means of increasing voter turnout and acquiring a greater share of the vote, and that strategic placement of the offices matters greatly. In this paper I will provide an overview of the sharp spike in campaign finances and the traditional campaigning methods of television and radio advertising, known as the “air war.” Then, I will provide in-depth analysis on the ground game and local field offices, as well as their impact and implications for the future. At the conclusion of the paper, I will relate the material presented to well-known theories regarding voting behaviors.

One notable aspect of recent elections is the enormous spike in campaign finances. During the 2012 presidential election, both parties spent approximately two billion dollars, which made the election one of the most expensive in history[1]. Most of this spending is done by Super PACs and PACs, or “political action committees”[2]. Most of this money is spent on media advertisements, but there is usually plenty left for other purposes. For a breakdown of spending during the last three election cycles, the New York Times illuminated SuperPAC fund allocations. More than 80% went to television advertising, with mail and online advertising adding another 10% and field work adding another 5%[3]. Although sixteen times more money was spent on television advertising by SuperPACs, field work had a significant impact in the last two elections. It may be even worthwhile to pay for field operatives, as paying them twenty dollars an hour would accrue a significant number of votes, while leaving plenty left for advertising[4]. Despite the substantial funds committed to media advertising, there is not much evidence to support it as a cost-effective campaign strategy. According to research conducted by Krasno and Green, voters who view heavy volumes of TV advertising are not more likely to vote than voters who view little of it[5]. One study assessed the impact of media advertising versus field operations, and the authors concluded that, “had the parties not been allowed to advertise, the Democrats would have won the 2004 election, but the results would have been largely the same for the next two elections,” which supports the claim that advertising does not play a great role in an election where one party has a clear advantage[6]. This is due to the Democrats’ clear advantages in the 2008 and 2012 elections. Furthermore, television advertisements do not generally communicate clear messages to constituents. They usually do not explicitly advocate for going to the polls, but transmit an implicit message that the election is important[7]. This is not an effective method of achieving a greater vote share for any party.

One other aspect integral to mass communication is the duration effect. Expensive tactics will not be cost-effective if their impact lasts a relatively short period of time. Hill et al.[8] claimed that, in order for mass communication to have strong effects, the electorate must pay thoughtful attention to it. They found that few voters tend to put the effort to process the political information they receive. Even if the campaign puts great effort into forming quality advertisements, there is no guarantee that voters will pay thoughtful attention to it. Given the lack of effectiveness and efficiency associated with media advertising, it is not obvious as to why it still gets a great share of the campaign budget. Eggen and Hamburger[9] contend that it is much simpler to provide a TV station with money than to forge a grass-roots campaign from scratch. Also, the political consultants working for campaigns are generally biased towards advertising, as they can collect more commissions from them[10]. It is convenient for political consultants to engage in these activities, but as the significance and impact of grassroots movements becomes more visible, campaigns may start moving more of their funds into this area.

In 2008, Barack Obama took a dive into the ground game. His campaign set up hundreds of field offices around the nation to mobilize a grassroots army of volunteers[11]. He mastered this strategy so well in 2008, and the GOP’s ground game did not represent “anything comparable to Obama’s ground operation” in 2012[12]. Obama understood that nothing beats face-to-face interaction. A study by Issenberg in 2012 showed that door-to-door activities by campaigns have a greater impact on voters than television advertisements[13]. Today, given the ease of data collection, researchers have been able to effectively study the effects of Obama’s ground game. Chung and Zhang[14] were able to collect 18,650 observations on campaign activities and vote outcomes, as well as collect comprehensive records of ground campaigning to demonstrate the significant impact of the ground game. Because the Obama campaign chose to employ these new, localized data-driven strategies, political scientists were able to collect good-quality, comprehensive data on its methods. This has opened up a whole new line of inquiry into campaign strategies and their effectiveness.

Door knocking is one method of “Getting Out the Vote,” or GOTV. Other methods include direct mail and phone calls, which are generally employed to a greater extent during campaigns[15]. On the whole, GOTV methods can be an effective means of acquiring votes. There is evidence to support that “individuals living in states that received concentrated GOTV efforts from campaigns [are] much more likely to turn out to vote compared to demographically similar individuals in the same media market who lived in a state receiving less GOTV effort,” which supports GOTV efforts relative to media advertising as a higher-impact technique[16]. In the most heavily targeted states in this study, GOTV increased voter turnout by about seven percentage points. The Obama campaign’s new tactics piqued the curiosity of some researchers, who wanted to compare the effectiveness of GOTV strategies. Even before the 2008 election, political scientists randomly sorted voters to get different methods of persuasion, including postcards, phone calls, canvassing, and nothing[17]. The voters who received the phone call or postcards were not significantly more likely to vote than the voters who received nothing. However, one face-to-face conversation through canvassing resulted in increased turnout of twenty percent, or nine percentage points in this case. This attests to the strength of in-person communication.

Until 2008, having a face-to-face interaction with a campaign was uncommon, but with the proliferation of a grassroots network of campaign volunteers, this was no longer the case. Previously, whatever field campaigns existed stressed quantity over quality, but the Obama campaign took a new approach, recruiting volunteers and leaders to engage with their respective communities in meaningful ways[18]. Rather than have someone outside of constituents’ communities try to persuade them to vote, it would be more convincing to engage with someone from their own community, whom they can relate to better. Having these conversations in person made campaigning more effective. One study showed that face-to-face interaction had a greater influence on voter turnout than professional, direct mail and professional phone banks[19]. However, simply having an in-person conversation is not enough. The exchange must be organic and genuine. Research shows that rushed, scripted interactions leave minimal impact, similar to the effect of a television advertisement[20]. This may reflect the feeling of an impersonal advertisement, which is not appealing to many voters.

If what the Obama campaign claims is true, that they focus on quality over quantity, then their ground game was effective on both fronts. In 2008, the Obama campaign contacted approximately twenty-five percent of all voters, while the McCain campaign contacted around eighteen percent[21]. The data suggest that “each marginal 10-point advantage in contact rate translated into a marginal 3-point gain in the popular vote in that state,” so it is possible that the Obama campaign contacted more voters with higher-quality interactions. At a mechanistic level, the campaign is loose. A campaign leader claimed that the focus was to have a “decentralized, organized operation as close to the precinct level as possible,” which would give campaign workers more freedom and flexibility to sway voters[22]. This is especially helpful when the campaign workers are reaching out to their own communities, which they know better than the campaign’s upper management does. These volunteers were critical for the campaign, as they took on a variety of roles. First and foremost, they were the initial point of contact between voters and the campaign[23]. They also recruited more volunteers, collected voter data for the campaign, and built comprehensive voter files on potential supporters and used what they knew to deliver specific messages[24]. With committed volunteers taking on a variety of roles for the campaign, Obama’s ground game stood above that of the Republican nominees.

One of the most crucial tools in Obama’s ground game was technology. Obama used a variety of technological avenues to get a lead over his opponents in the ground game. The campaign’s tech team developed a tool called Narwhal, which employed sophisticated “demographic data mining, consumer marketing, video production, social media,” and even a social networking tool for campaign volunteers[25]. The team took a multi-faceted approach to tackle several avenues of campaign work. One way Narwhal used demographic data was by pairing volunteers with potential supporters. For example, the program knew that veterans liked talking to one another, and the elderly liked to hear from young people, so it would set up such interactions[26]. This helped make face-to-face interactions more meaningful. The Romney team tried to come up with their own technological approach by creating a tool called “Orca,” but it experienced many technical difficulties and proved to be ineffective[27]. The Obama campaign’s investment in technology laid a firm foundation for strong ground game operations throughout the duration of the campaign.

Such data mining algorithms existed before, but explicitly for consumer marketing. The Obama campaign used marketing data mining techniques used for businesses to better attract customers and adapted them for campaigns to better attract voters[28]. Anthony Downs did something similar when he adapted Hotelling’s spatial model into the median voter theorem. Hotelling explained that companies would move to a point where they could get more customers than their competitors, and after several iterations, both companies would end up at equilibrium, right next to each other and in a centralized location[29]. Downs applied this to political parties, and also interchanged “customers” with “voters,” claiming that parties would move to a point on a political spectrum where they could attract more voters than the other party[30]. Eventually, both would end up at equilibrium, as with the companies.

Another key aspect of the ground game is the field office. The field office tends “to be a point of first contact between a campaign and its volunteers, who are promptly put to work on an array of campaign tasks” in the precinct[31]. One of the most strategic decisions to be made for the ground game is where to situate the field office. This turns into a spatial problem. In one paper, Allen et al.[32] performed a “geo-spatial analysis of turnout for all voters based on proximity to campaign field office locations,” predicting that voters closer to field offices would be more likely to turnout than those farther away. Their results supported this hypothesis. As field offices have limited resources, they will be as efficient as possible and interact with areas around the office most. Also, the visible reminder of the office may influence voters. They also claim that this is the case because field offices foster personal interactions, and it is easier to accomplish this by being in close proximity to a field office[33].

At a more general level, Obama did better than McCain in counties where he had established a field office, which may have helped him switch three battleground states[34]. Furthermore, setting up a Democratic field office not only increased democratic voter share, but voter turnout as well[35]. Other notes of importance are that field operations are “more effective among those with weaker partisan preferences”[36], and increased county-level vote share by about one percent[37]. For the Obama campaign, this corresponded to 325,000 votes overall. Lastly, field offices serve a purpose outside of presidential campaigns. In 2008, Obama placed field offices in Utah, a very red state, in order to lay a foundation for future elections[38]. This would help down-ballot Democrats in the future, which attests to the key, strategic significance of field offices. Field offices improve both party vote share and general turnout in counties where they are located, have the most influence on voters surrounding them, are effective for swaying swing voters, and are of strategic importance for future elections. The Obama campaign’s activities allowed for pioneering research to be able to be conducted to study the campaign’s tactics and find such evidence. This knowledge will be crucial for future campaigns.

Not only the location, but the number of field offices is also critical. Across the nation, Obama had set up 755 field offices in 2012, while Romney set up 283, which is less than half of that[39]. Furthermore, breaking it down by swing state, Obama had 122 offices in Ohio, while Romney had 40. Obama had 102 offices in Florida, while Romney had 48. Lastly, in Virginia, Obama had 47 offices, while Romney had 29[40]. Given the spatial model, it would appear that Obama’s proliferation of field offices allowed him to have a more expansive ground game and influence even more voters to vote Democrat.

Several well-known political theories can help put these campaign developments in context. First of all, Lynn Vavreck’s[41] economic voting model is especially interesting in this context. Vavreck’s model of clarifying candidates who clarify their position on the economy and insurgent candidates who focus attention on an issue in which their position is closer to most voters, does not apply well to the 2012 election. In 2008, Obama was the clarifying candidate, pointing out the poor economic conditions at the end of a Republican tenure. In 2012, there was still a poor economy, and Mitt Romney ran a clarifying campaign, but did not win. Also, Obama did not focus on an issue in which his position was closer to most voters, so he did not have much of an insurgent campaign. What Obama did have, however, was a much more effective ground game than Mitt Romney. This claim is more convincing given the reams of evidence from studies conducted on the Obama campaign’s ground game. Possibly, Vavreck should clarify her economic model to give some weight to the ground game. Her book, “The Message Matters,” should note that a superior ground game can convey a clearer message through personalized, meaningful interactions.

Robert Putnam’s[42] work on social capital and civil society also bear relevance. Putnam notes that trust is dependent on face-to-face interactions among group members, which was a key aspect of the Obama campaign’s ground game. Civic activity has eroded since the 1970s, but interacting with field office volunteers is a form of civic activity, so there may be a resurgence in it. Previously, social capital was created with local organizations, like chapters of Elks, labor unions, and churches. The local aspect and interaction is maintained by local field offices to an extent. For example, Obama’s campaign strategy relied on having community members reach out to others in their communities, so there was a level of social capital to begin with. It may be that the repeated, face-to-face interactions of the ground game build trust, and in turn, social capital. This may explain why personal interaction is very effective and salient in campaigning, and why Obama had so much support.

A personal meeting that goes well can even be looked at in a new context: as a heuristic for voting. Samuel Popkin[43] writes that voters reason about parties based on inferences they make of the world around them. They are low-information rationality voters, which means they use gut reasoning by combining information from past experience, daily life, and the media. They employ heuristics to come to a decision with low information. A face-to-face interaction with a volunteer is memorable and can leave a positive, trusting impact. This impression may very well be used as a heuristic shortcut by a low-information rationality voter. It may also be memorable enough to last until election time, which the aforementioned studies suggest, especially when compared to media advertising. Voters also look for demographic clues, and notice which groups are supporting the candidate. If an effective ground game can influence the neighbors and friends of a potential voter, by this mechanism the voter could also come to support the campaign and vote.

Lastly, the placement of field offices relates to Anthony Downs spatial median voter theorem[44]. As parties will situate themselves in the middle of the political spectrum so as to get the greatest share of voters, so will campaign field offices. This spatial model is more involved, as it happens in two dimensions, not one. The geography of a county is a plane, not a line. Also, the campaigns need to situate their field offices so as to get swing voters and ensure turnout in existing supporters[45]. Both parties are targeting the same swing voters, but their existing supporters differ in spatial orientation. Because of this, the parties must strategically situate their field offices in a location that overlaps in proximity to swing voters and existing supporters. Because Republican and Democratic supporters may live in different areas, the field offices may not be situated right next to each other. This model adds another dimension to the Downs model, but is related and it is insightful to compare them.

Barack Obama’s 2008 and 2012 elections support the importance and strategic significance of the “ground game.” Before these elections, media advertising dominated campaigns in financial expenditures to a much greater extent. By deciding to invest in an aggressive ground game, the Obama campaign has made a mark in campaign history and may change the way presidential candidates campaign. Especially with more funds being spent in national elections, a well-funded ground game can accrue a significant share of the votes if approached the right way. At least so far, the Obama campaign seems to be innovative in this approach, recruiting community members into grassroots organizing and technology experts for data-driven support. Advanced data mining algorithms showed where to place field offices and how to campaign at the local level. Political scientists were able to closely study the campaign’s strategy and analyze data in order to assess the impact of the ground game and placement of field offices. The results are overwhelmingly in favor of it. Face-to-face interactions make a positive impression on the electorate, especially when achieved with organic, genuine conversation. Looking at the ground game through the lenses of multiple theories makes for some interesting analysis and insight. As the ground game gains greater recognition, it will become a more prevalent campaign tactic, and political scientists will create more models concerning it. As Tip O’Neill, former speaker of the house once said, “all politics is local”[46].

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[1] Chung, Doug J., and Lingling Zhang. “The Air War versus The Ground Game: An Analysis

of Multi-Channel Marketing in U.S. Presidential Elections. Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-033, (October 2014.)

[2] Calmes, Jackie. “Obama Campaign Banks on High-Tech Ground Gem to Reach Voters.” New York Times (26 June 2012): n. pag. The New York Times. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/us/politics/obama-campaign-banks-on-a-high-tech-ground-game.html?pagewanted=alland_r=2and>.

[3] Broockman, David, and Joshua Kalla. “Experiments Show This Is the Best Way to

Win Campaigns. But Is Anyone Actually Doing It?” Vox (13 Nov. 2014): n. pag.

Vox. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://www.vox.com/2014/11/13/7214339/

campaign-ground-game>.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Krasno, Jonathan S., and Donald P. Green. “Do Televised Presidential Ads Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” Journal of Politics. 70.1 (2008): 245-61. Print.

[6] Chung, Doug J., and Lingling Zhang. “The Air War versus The Ground Game: An Analysis

of Multi-Channel Marketing in U.S. Presidential Elections.”

[7] Krasno, Jonathan S., and Donald P. Green. “Do Televised Presidential Ads Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence from a Natural Experiment.”

[8] Hill, Seth J., Lo, J., Vavreck, L., and Zaller, J. “How Quickly We Forget: The Duration of Persuasion Effects from Mass Communication.” Political Communication. 30.4 (2013): 521-47. Print.

[9] Eggen, Dan, and Tom Hamburger. “Private Consultants See Huge Election Profits.” Washington Post (10 Nov. 2012): n. pag. The Washington Post. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/ private-consultants-see-huge-election-profits/2012/11/10/edaab580-29d8-11e2-96b6-8e6a7524553f_story.html>.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Calmes, Jackie. “Obama Campaign Banks on High-Tech Ground Gem to Reach Voters.”

[12] Ball, Molly. “Obama’s Edge: The Ground Game That Could Put Him over the Top.” Atlantic (24 Oct. 2012): n. pag. The Atlantic. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/obamas-edge-the-ground-game-that-could-put-him-over-the-top/264031/>.

[13] Allen, Kristen C., Cayton, A., Masket, S., Minkoff, S., Sokhey, A. “Office Space: A Geo-Spatial Analysis of the Effects of Field Offices on Voter Turnout.” (2014). Digital file.

[14] Chung, Doug J., and Lingling Zhang. “The Air War versus The Ground Game: An Analysis of Multi-Channel Marketing in U.S. Presidential Elections.”

[15] Enos, Ryan D., and Anthony Fowler. “The Effects of Large-Scale Campaigns on Voter Turnout: Evidence from 400 Million Voter Contacts.” N.p.: n.p., (2014). Print.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Broockman, David, and Joshua Kalla. “Experiments Show This Is the Best Way to Win Campaigns. But Is Anyone Actually Doing It?”

[18] Chung, Doug J., and Lingling Zhang. “The Air War versus The Ground Game.”

[19] Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment.” American Political Science Review. 94.3 (2000): 653-63. Print.

[20] Broockman, David, and Joshua Kalla. “Experiments Show This Is the Best Way to Win Campaigns. But Is Anyone Actually Doing It?”

[21] Cohen, Micah. “The General Election Ground Game: A First Look.” New York Times (17 Apr. 2012): n. pag. The New York Times. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/the-general-election-ground-game-a-first-look/?_r=1>.

[22] Ball, Molly. “Obama’s Edge: The Ground Game That Could Put Him over the Top.”

[23] Sinderbrand, Rebecca. “Analysis: Obama Won with a Better Ground Game.” CNN (7 Nov. 2012): n. pag. CNN. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/analysis-why-obama-won/>.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Calmes, Jackie. “Obama Campaign Banks on High-Tech Ground Gem to Reach Voters.”

[26] Vuong, Andy. “Greeley’s Harper Reed the Technology Mastermind behind Obama’s Win.” Denver Post (27 Jan. 2013): n. pag. The Denver Post. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_22454166/greeleys-harper-reed-technology-mastermind-behind-obamas-win?source=infinite>.

[27] Lake, Eli, Daniel Klaidman, and Ben Jacobs. “The Romney Campaign’s Ground Game Fiasco.” Daily Beast (9 Nov. 2012): n. pag. The Daily Beast. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/09/the-romney-campaign-s-ground-game-fiasco.html>.

[28] Vuong, Andy. “Greeley’s Harper Reed the Technology Mastermind behind Obama’s Win.”

[29] Stokes, Donald E. “Spatial Models of Party Competition.” American Political Science Review. 57.2 (1963): 368-77. Print.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Allen, Kristen Coopie, et al. “Office Space: A Geo-Spatial Analysis of the Effects of Field Offices on Voter Turnout.”

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Masket, Seth E. “Did Obama’s Ground Game Matter? The Influence of Local Field Offices during the 2008 Presidential Election.” Public Opinion Quarterly. 73.5 (2009): 1023-39. Print.

[35] Allen, Kristen Coopie, et al. “Office Space: A Geo-Spatial Analysis of the Effects of Field Offices on Voter Turnout.”

[36] Chung, Doug J., and Lingling Zhang. “The Air War versus The Ground Game.”

[37] Darr, Joshua P., Luke J. Keele, and Matthew S. Levendusky. Relying on the Ground Game: The Placement and Effect of Campaign Field Offices. (2012). Print.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Avlon, John, and Michael Keller. “Ground Game: Obama Campaign Opens up a Big Lead in Field Offices.” Daily Beast (19 Oct. 2012): n. pag. The Daily Beast. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/19/ground-game-obama-campaign-opens-up-a-big-lead-in-field-offices.html>.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Vavreck, Lynn. The Message Matters: The Economy and Presidential Campaigns. Princeton: Princeton UP. (2009). Print.

[42] Putnam, Robert D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Shuster. (2000). Print.

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